1. Introduction One nation, one election proposes to hold synchronised elections across the country. The policy presents itself as the fixer of the logistical hazards of Indian elections by conducting simultaneous elections for the centre and the state. Another argument that the policy makes is that fewer elections would lead to more focus on governance and less on elections, however this proposal poses a risk to Indian democracy by undermining its foundations.
2. Importance of Federal Polity Article 1 of the constitution describes India as a ‘union of states’, therefore even though India is one union,each state constitutes a separate political and cultural entity.The states have their own elected government with legislative and administrative powers. These states do not function in a linear manner.Eminent Jurist M.P Singh calls Indian federalism as “asymmetric federalism”1 which is to say that states are not merely regional territories as they differ in forms and constitutional identities. The constitution makes special provisions for states (Articles 371 to 371-J of the Indian Constitution provide flexible legal and administrative safeguards to twelve states), they have different legislative lists(schedule 7, list II), and separate Executive and Legislatures( Part IV and Article 168). Therefore it is safe to conclude that states are distinct constitutional entities from the centre. Furthermore, States also constitute separate political and cultural entities with demands distinct from those present in the national discourse. These distinct demands and discourses have been healthy for the Indian democracy and have curbed one-party dominance, autocratic tendencies and suppression of regional representation. For instance even at the pinnacle of its powers, the Congress lost an election in Kerala in 1957, in the 1990s, the rise of regional parties dictated national politics with the rise of parties such as the Bahujan Samaj Party, Janata Dal, Samajwadi Party etc. which eventually made the parliament a more
Mahendra Pal Singh, 'The Federal Scheme' in Sujit Choudhry, Madhav Khosla and Pratap Bhanu Mehta (eds), The Oxford Handbook of the Indian Constitution (Oxford University Press 2016) 451. inclusive as well as an accountable space as the government was a coalition government with no single party dominance.2 Furthermore, The Supreme Court in the case of S.R Bommai v/s Union of India3 stated that federalism is part of the basic structure of the constitution and that state governments are not subordinate to the central government. Therefore a multi-party rule with the inculcation of multiple regional interests is essential for a healthy democracy 2.1 How one nation, one election undermines federal polity A study done by the Indian Statistical Institute, Delhi stated that if elections are synchronised, the probability of a single party winning increases drastically and split-ticket voting i.e a voter voting for different parties at the centre and the state level decreases. The study also stated that synchronised elections can weaken federalism as regional interests might get overshadowed, electoral accountability may diminish and the political significance of state governments can be undermined4. Thus ONOE tends to cause a plethora of problems with regards to federalism and accountability. This study demonstrates how ONOE could lead to a single party dominance along with the subsuming of regional interests, which will put Indian democracy at risk as this would make it susceptible to not only one-party dominance, but dominance of one discourse which will lead to the overlooking of varied interests.
Furthermore, the 129th amendment bill proposes Article 82A which aims to synchronise the terms of the state assemblies to the lok sabha elections5. This abruption of state assemblies would be unjust to the people’s mandate as well as the incumbent government. The logic of ONOE is to bring convenience in governance, however an abruption of state assemblies would go against this very foundation as the government machinery functioning in the state would have to engage in elections rather than focusing on governance.
Suhas Palshikar, 'Politics of Social Justice' in Indian Democracy (Oxford University Press 2017) ch 5. (1994) 3 SCC 1 Vimal Balasubramaniam, Apurav Yash Bhatiya and Sabyasachi Das, Do Synchronised Elections Matter for Electoral Outcomes? Evidence from India (Indian Statistical Institute, Delhi, September 2019).
Constitution (One Hundred and Twenty-Ninth Amendment) Bill 2024, Bill No 275 of 2024.
3. Impact on democratic engagement and accountability Democracy in its purest sense is a government driven by people’s participation in governance and decision making. Marsilius of Padua stated that the ultimate ‘legislator’ or source of legitimate political authority in the community is ‘the people’6. However, in an electoral democracy, the people choose their representatives to make decisions on their behalf. Therefore, participation and democratic engagement only happens during elections. In India, the citizens exercise their ‘will’ usually every five years. This ‘will’ differs regionally and nationally, for instance, national issues usually pertain to larger questions such as defence, nationalism etc. whereas regional issues focus on local issues such as migrants, law and order etc. One election across the country will therefore lessen democratic participation on behalf of the true flagbearers of democracy- the people as fewer elections would mean less democratic engagement. This will also result in less accountability on behalf of the government as political parties will have election related incentive to be accountable only once in 5 years, whereas constant elections ensure constant accountability.
4. Way forward Dr. B.R Ambedkar in the constituent assembly stated that states are not agents of the union7, therefore the states are distinct entities and their interests should not be undermined.ONOE would lead to the subsuming of regional interests and would undermine federalism. Secondly, elections not only ensure democratic engagement but also accountability, reducing elections to a singular occurrence would lead to less accountability and engagement which would curb people’s demands and participation in the democracy.Thirdly, proponents of the policy argue that the model code of conduct disrupts governance, however the MCC is implemented when the election schedule is announced, which is mere months before the election takes place and even if MCC is to be viewed as a disrupter of governance, changes to MCC rather than the election procedure should be sought. Lastly, ONOE fixes one logistical hazard by replacing it with another as one election across the country would require substantially more infrastructure than
David Held, 'Republicanism: Liberty, Self-Government and the Active Citizen' in Models of Democracy (3rd edn, Polity Press 2006) ch 2.
BR Ambedkar, 'Basic Features of the Indian Constitution' in Valerian Rodrigues (ed), The Essential Writings of B.R. Ambedkar (Oxford University Press 2002) 473. what the nation has.8 To better the logistics of elections, elections can be conducted on a single day instead of phases. Therefore the myth of logistical convenience should not result in the undermining of constitutional and democratic ideals.
Siddhant Sumon, One Nation, One Election: The Implementation Hurdles (Policy Research Lab, Jindal School of Government and Public Policy, O.P. Jindal Global University, 29 October 2024)